Saturday, August 18, 2012

why do you need a sales force?


CEO’s  Perspective :  Earlier  CEOs  would have focused on compensation, training, and automation  when  thinking  about  their  sales  force,  but  in recently  CEOs  are  asking  more fundamental  questions : “Do I need a salesforce at all?” asked  a   chairman of one technology company. Another CEO asked, “What is the difference between selling and marketing? I’m not sure I understand the distinction clearly any more.” The head of a big communications company suggested, “Perhaps the time has come to ask the most basic question of all: what is the purpose of a salesforce?”

Sales  forces will need to create value, not  merely  communicate it.  But  the  fact  is  that  even in the same industry, different customers see value very differently  and  your  selling strategy  needs  to  change  by  customer type.

RIP  VAN  WINKLE
Suppose a corporate Rip Van Winkle who fell asleep on the job a generation ago were to wake up today. He would find his company changed almost beyond recognition  except  the  good  old  sales  department.  True, most people now have laptop computers, though many of them seem more decorative than useful. And there are more women in the department; he would now be a “salesperson” rather than a “salesman.” But most other things in the office don’t surprise him. The company decides to give Rip back his old sales job, so he goes out with his manager to see if selling itself has changed. He finds that for the most part it is comfortingly familiar. There is certainly a wider range of products, and many of them seem more complex. Competition is intense, and the pace of work is faster. The hard sell now appears to be officially discouraged, but even in the old days Rip preferred to sell through relationships rather than pressure. He is still expected to fill in call reports, although technology now lets him enter his lies and excuses electronically. Pay is higher than it was a generation ago, but it still comes in the form of base plus commission. His sales manager coaches him in such familiar terms — features and benefits, objection handling, open and closed questions, and so forth — that he feels as though he has never been asleep. In fact, just about everything she says comes almost word for word from E. K. Strong’s The Psychology of Selling, published back in 1925. “Well,” thinks Rip, “selling will always be selling. I could probably get away with it if I napped for another couple of years.”
WINDS  OF  CHANGE
What  he  thinks  is  wrong;  because  powerful new forces have begun to change the world of selling. According to some estimates, within  years  today’s selling positions will vanish !   Time-honored territorial structures are disappearing  and  even  the  substance of selling is itself in flux.  Some organizations have already crossed the threshold of this new world. Until a few years ago, Microsoft, for example, had a salesforce that offered software in bulk to corporate accounts in typical business-to-business transactions. Today, its sales reps spend their time organizing and mobilizing networks of independent solution providers such as systems specialists, trainers, software designers, and installers. In the past, when you called Charles Schwab, which pioneered telephone sales of brokerage services in the 1970s, you talked with a broker (or salesperson by another name) who transacted your business for you. Now you can choose to dial up Schwab on the Internet and place your trades yourself.

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF A SALESFORCE?
For many years, salesforces have existed to communicate the value of their companies’ offerings. But while the sales function has been busy fulfilling this role, a great change has swept over the business world. Other functions — manufacturing, engineering, product development, and even human resources — have been restructuring and realigning themselves to create more value for customers. Activities that do not add value have been pared down or eliminated.
Such new approaches to work as continuous improvement, the reengineering of business processes, Kaizen, and self-directed work teams have been introduced to create high-quality products and services more cheaply and efficiently. Put simply, other functions have become conscious value creators. In today’s enterprises, it is hard for functions and even individuals to survive — and impossible for them to prosper — unless they clearly add value for customers.

In yesterday’s world, it was feasible to argue that by communicating product information to customers, the salesforce was actually adding value. “We’re useful to doctors because we educate them on the latest drugs,” a pharmaceutical rep told us. “We tell them about new options that haven’t gotten into the reference books. Without us, doctors would quickly become out of date.”

But buyers now tend to know as much about products as do the people selling them — or more. The advent of specialization in medicine, for example, means that many doctors have participated in clinical trials or learned about the effects of new drugs well before they are approved for release. Buyers in other industries, too, are better informed than they used to be. So much information about almost everything is now so accessible that the need for an expensive salesperson to dispense it has come under increasing doubt.
The ubiquity of information is not the only force transforming the sales function. Another is the decline in differentiation between products. As they become commodities, their features have less significance for customers. Value migrates from the product to the way in which it is acquired, and customers start to attach more importance to the acquisition environment they prefer.

Unfortunately, generations of salespeople have been brought up with the notion that they create value by bringing in revenue. But bringing in revenue means collecting value, not creating it. And that is not enough to survive in today’s competitive markets.

VALUE IS IN THE EYE OF THE  CUSTOMER
The idea that a salesforce must create value and not just communicate it is simple and attractive. But what does it really mean? Ask academics or consultants, and they will tell you that value, at its simplest, is defined by the equation value = benefits — cost. So there appear to be two ways for sales departments to create value: they can either generate additional benefits or reduce the cost of the benefits they already provide.  
  • In the first case, a company might increase the ability of its salesforce to deliver benefits by giving reps more technical support, by improving their problem-solving capabilities, or by allowing them to spend more time working on customers’ issues.
  • In the second case, the company must find cheaper ways to sell. Some organizations that aim to create value by cutting sales costs have relied on telephone selling or part-time salespeople. Others have abolished the salesforce altogether, moving to channel distribution, catalogs, or electronic commerce.
Strategically, which way is better: creating new benefits or cutting the cost of old ones? Most people prefer the former, seeing it as the way to create a bigger pie, capture more profit, and lavish so much extra value on the customer that competition withers away. A salesforce that adds new value feels more successful than one that slashes costs. Yet many organizations have charged down this path only to discover that they have devised costly strategies that are neither valued nor rewarded by the market, and that make them less competitive than ever.

The better approach depends entirely on the customer; indeed, it is the customer who decides whether any benefit is real. Different customers, even in the same industry, have very different notions of value. If a company gives its salesforce the ability to provide new benefits that customers genuinely want, they will cheerfully pay well for those benefits. But if customers are indifferent, the company may well lose business. Traditional sales thinking fails to recognize this reality.


SEGMENTATION  BY SIZE ISN’T SUFFICIENT

Since the 1960s, most sales organizations have segmented their customers by size, a practice that has served well for 30 years. But it is no longer sufficient. Consider the three largest accounts of  XYZ  Insurance Group: three insurance brokers of roughly the same size. A key account sales team at Sleepy Hollow would try to sell its products to all three in much the same way, using similar amounts of resources. Yet despite their superficial similarities, the three customers have very different needs:

Customer A, an aggressive regional broker, tells Sleepy Hollow, “Don’t send me your salespeople, just send your quotes. And those quotes had better be fast and cheap, because you have a dozen competitors who will get our business if they beat you on speed and price.”

Customer B, a broker that has grown through mergers and consolidation, has a very different story. “We need a lot of help. Every one of our offices does things its own way. We don’t have a common set of procedures or a common information system. We’ll write a lot of business with you if your people are prepared to work with each office individually and help it get its act together.” Here, there is a chance for the salesforce to create real value.

Customer C seeks yet another kind of relationship. “What we want is a strategic partner that will put its underwriters into our offices, develop cutting-edge information systems with us to turn quotes around more quickly than anyone had thought possible, and work with us to develop new and innovative risk management systems. We’d like to leverage some of your back-office knowhow, and we’d be interested in having your marketing people contribute to our internal planning process.”

How does a typical salesforce geared to judging its effort by the size of its customer handle these three requests? Badly. A salesforce dedicated to serving large customers usually expends too many resources on the first account. This kind of customer does not want — and will not pay for — an expensive investment in selling time. Companies can waste or destroy value by putting unwarranted effort into these accounts.

By contrast, large customers of the third kind expect a heavy investment in selling effort. Yet all too often such an investment can be misplaced, with salespeople seeing themselves as value communicators when what the customer is looking for is value creators. The selling effort mistakenly focuses on persuasion rather than on understanding: salespeople spend time explaining and differentiating products instead of bringing new insights and value to the customer by diagnosing its problems and needs.

Needless to say, similar problems can undermine the efforts of salesforces dedicated to serving smaller customers. Although segmentation by size would imply that such customers can expect only a small sales effort, some of them are actually prepared to pay handsomely for advice and help. But most salesforces are not designed for this type of customer, lacking any mechanism to allow salespeople to play a value-added role. As a result, the opportunity to create and capture value is lost.

MATCHING STRATEGY TO CUSTOMERS

But it is not only in resource allocation that salesforces typically go awry. They also fail to recognize that different approaches to selling may be needed for different customers, even if they are similar in size. To succeed, they must learn that customers should be segmented according to the way they perceive value. Such a segmentation yields three distinct categories, each requiring its own approach

Transactional sales :  For customer A and its peers, value is intrinsic to the product alone. The salesforce adds little or nothing for them, since they already understand what they are buying and know how they want to use it. Viewing it as a commodity, they simply want a favorable cost, reckoned either by price or by ease of acquisition, and they resent the time they have to spend with salespeople. Such customers call for transactional sales techniques that should be as risk-free, hassle-free, and efficient as possible.  Wal-Mart, for example, deals with relatively small suppliers, but it refuses to meet regularly with their salespeople. As a Wal-Mart spokesperson noted, it would be better if “their salaries and commissions were taken off the price. Why should we pay for something that takes up our time without providing anything in return?” And it is no longer only traditional industrial commodity suppliers that sell in this way; such professional service providers as lawyers, accountants, consultants, and doctors — people who never dreamed that their activities might be regarded as commodities — find that more and more of their clients want to purchase transactionally.

Consultative sales : Customer B looks largely at the extrinsic elements of the value equation. For such customers, value is not inherent in the product; rather, it lies chiefly in how the product is used. In this case, a salesforce can create a great deal of new value. Putting a premium on advice and help, these customers expect it to enlarge their understanding of their needs and options. This kind of consultative selling, which calls for a salesforce that gets close to customers and has an intimate grasp of their business needs, involves an investment of time and effort by seller and customer alike.  In consultative sales, the ability to listen and build up an understanding of the customer’s business is a more important selling skill than persuasion; empathy takes precedence over product knowledge. A salesforce of this kind creates value in three primary ways:
  • it can help customers understand their problems and opportunities in a new or different way
  • it can provide better solutions than customers would have discovered themselves;
  • it can act as their advocate inside its own company to ensure that resources are allocated to them in a timely way and that solutions meet their particular needs.  
Because these are demanding tasks, good consultative salespeople are hard to find. Organizations seeking to improve their consultative selling abilities can easily fall hostage to highly paid star performers. For this reason, effective consultative sales efforts increasingly use diagnostic tools, sales processes, and information systems that allow ordinary mortals to perform the increasingly sophisticated consultative selling role.

Enterprise sales : Customer C and others like it demand an extraordinary level of value creation. They do not simply want the products or advice of the supplier; they also want to make full use of its core competencies, and will transform their own organizations and strategies to make the most of their strategic value relationship. In such a situation, it is almost impossible to tell who is selling and who is buying. This is an alliance between business equals working together to capture an extraordinary level of new value that neither could have created alone.  Such customers call for an enterprise sales effort in which both the product and the salesforce are secondary: its primary function is rather to leverage any and all of the supplier’s corporate assets to contribute to the customer’s strategic success. No single salesperson, or even sales team, can set up or maintain an enterprise relationship; it is invariably initiated at a very high level in both organizations. It is closely linked to the customer’s strategic direction and usually implemented by cross-functional teams on each side.  A good way to think about enterprise selling is to see it as the redesign and continuous improvement of the boundary between supplier and customer. Often, hundreds of people participate directly in such a relationship, and it is difficult if not impossible to tell where selling begins and ends.

EXAMPLES  OF  CEOs  ADOPTING  WRONG  APPROACHES

Example  1 :  A bottom-line buyer
A manufacturer of packaging materials competed in a marketplace where more than 90 percent of customers were bottom-line value buyers who bought transactionally. Because the manufacturer’s costs were slightly higher than those of competitors, it was losing business. It decided that the best way to halt this decline would be to upgrade its salesforce. Instead of sales reps, it now sent out packaging consultants charged with adding value by giving customers help and advice.  The effort to recruit, retrain, and develop a new marketing strategy cost upward of $10 million. Operating expenses were even more frightening. The average cost of each sales call was no less than $890, and the average cost of acquiring a new account was $112,000 — far more than a normal account generated in profits over its entire life.  The strategy was a disaster. These customers neither needed nor wanted help and advice; for them, value lay only in the product. They needed packaging material, pure and simple, and that was all they would pay for. In other words, they made their purchases transactionally, but the manufacturer had embarked on a costly consultative strategy. Not long after, a major competitor bought the company at a bargain price and cut the cost of sales by reverting to a transactional selling force that suited the way customers created value.

Example 2 :  “Make the sale and move on”
A small consulting company developed a number of offerings to improve the productivity of its clients. As a consulting firm, it did not have a dedicated salesforce; instead, its consultants worked closely with clients to define their needs and create tailored solutions — a classic example of consultative sales. Seeing an opportunity to expand its market, the company brought in a chief executive who had previously worked in the packaged software business. He was horrified at the length of the selling cycle and the use of expensive consultants in the business development process.

The new chief executive removed consultants from the direct selling role. He created a telephone sales organization staffed with salespeople on commission who were managed with ruthless cost efficiency to increase coverage. Instructed to “make the sale and move on,” they did not spend what was now regarded as unnecessary time understanding the business needs of their customers. The number of new customer contacts quadrupled, while the cost of each contact fell by more than half. In this way, the chief executive succeeded in creating a high-coverage, low-cost transactional salesforce.
Unfortunately, the company’s clients — especially the most profitable ones — were extrinsic value buyers who bought consultatively. They were willing to pay well for the understanding of their business and the customized solutions that the company had provided in the past. Under the new regime, many of them defected to competitors that offered value-creating salesforces. The company began to lose business, and soon decided to lose its chief executive. By returning to a more expensive model that matched its clients’ value expectations, the company was able to regain some of its lost ground.

Example 3 : The end of a relationship
A manufacturer of containers had a long-term association with a major food company, which it supplied not only with containers but also with special machinery and advice on container design. The relationship was good and happy on both sides. One day, the customer asked if the manufacturer would be interested in a different kind of relationship that would involve taking on some of the customer’s production activities and joining with it to develop (and share the risks of) radically new approaches to packaging.   Lacking the authority to respond to such a revolutionary proposal, the sales team took it back to top management. “We’re not equipped to run their lines,” said the CEO. “We’re not a food production company, and this codevelopment idea sounds mighty risky. But they are a valued customer, so let’s offer them lots of extra design and engineering support.” To the CEO’s surprise, the customer declined the help and switched to a new supplier whose president and executive team had worked for six months at a high level within the food company to create new risk-sharing strategies.  The new supplier agreed to manage all the production lines of the food company and work with it to develop a range of innovative packaging concepts created by an R&D team that included members from both companies. The customer had wanted a strategic value relationship with its old supplier, which was unable to offer it within the constraints of its consultative selling effort. A new supplier that understood how to initiate high-level enterprise sales was able to shatter a 30-year relationship. The old supplier recently announced a downturn in its results and a major restructuring.
These cases — and hundreds like them — show that it is fatal to adopt one sales model if customers want another. No amount of selling skill, clever strategy, or well-crafted value proposition can bridge the gap between what a customer wants and what a supplier has to offer. A salesforce cannot transform transactional customers into consultative ones, or vice versa. At best, effective selling can shift the balance slightly, but it is an uphill struggle. In an age when customers not only demand more value than ever before but are increasingly clear about the kind of value they want, a salesforce must align its values with theirs.

What is more, the value expectations of big business customers, small business customers, and even individual consumers are changing dramatically. As a result, salesforces are in the early stages of a transformation that will affect every aspect of selling. From the simplest transactional sales right through to massive enterprise relationships that are reshaping the entire business strategies of the participants, the changes are profound and irreversible. And they are gathering speed. Individual salespeople are bound to feel alarmed, confused, and uncertain.
We wish we could say the same of the salesforces they work for, but too many seem to be dozing, oblivious of the forces that will ultimately drive them to extinction. Almost everywhere, transactional salesforces have unsustainably high cost structures; consultative salesforces don’t sell deeply enough to win business; and would-be enterprise players lack the cross-functional capacity to create enough value to cover the huge costs of this approach . Salesforces of companies that are household names remain firmly convinced that their mission is to communicate value, seemingly unaware that some of their smarter competitors are already learning to create it.

The message for these sleepy sales functions is simple: wake up fast! Our corporate Rip Van Winkle may have slept for a generation and woken to find not much changed, but any sales function today that dozes off even for a few months will not be worth waking. Salesforces must think in terms of value creation and understand how to structure and manage the transactional, consultative, or enterprise elements of the sales effort to forge new value for customers. This is a time of unprecedented opportunity for thoughtful players. In the past, selling offered high rewards to those with the energy to sell hard and the tactics to close deals. In the new era, it will offer even greater bounty to those that can sell smart and understand and implement strategies for creating customer value.

Niall Fitzgerald on Branding 2001


Annual Marketing Society Lecture.  London.  19 June 2001
By  Niall  FitzGerald ,   Chairman, Unilever

He was answering criticism that branding is “ hollow” :  a clever technique for persuading consumers to pay more for their goods and that it is artificially  constructed  and  then imposed  on  gullible  public and is more in the interests of the owners than in the interests of the customers.

FACTS  ABOUT  BRANDING

Brands exist because people want them to exist!  Even if  ‘marketing’ had never been invented and advertising  banned, there would still be brands!!  People  need  brands   because  they  help  them  simplify  a  complicated  world  of  bewildering  array  of   ever-widening  and  increasingly  undifferentiated  choices.  People  need   a  navigating  tool  to  consistently  reach  the  same  destination  once  they  have  found  it.  They  need  a  cue,  a  symbol,  a  brand  to  to  quickly  get  what  they   want ,  based  on  their  previous  experience.

Put  a name on a product — brand  it  — and   there’s  (generally)

1.      a guarantee of consistency because there is a custodian

2.      If you like what you’ve bought once, you can buy it again and again. If you don’t like what you’ve bought once, you know how to avoid buying it again.

3.      there’s now someone to go  to  for  redressal  if  anything goes wrong

There are premium brands but they are  not only for the affluent.  In fact, for  poor  people,  they are more important because mistake  even  in  a  trivial purchase  is  a  serious mistake.


PEOPLE CREATE BRANDS 
They  attach  qualities  to  them  and   expect  to  consistently  find /  avoid  them, People  detest homogeneity. They  brand   countries,  communities,  schools,  animals,  streets  and  even  people  by  attributing  images  and  satisfactions  and  personality  to  them  so  that  they  know  what  to  go  for  and  what  to  avoid. A brand  (unlike the product it contains)  is created by, is valued by, and lives exclusively in the minds of its consumers.

5  reasons why brands die : arrogance, greed, complacency, inconsistency and myopia.

ARROGANCE
  • You forget that a brand belongs to the  consumers : you  think  it  belongs  to  the  brand managers. You lose sight  that it is the  consumers (not you)  who  invested  brand with its value.
  • Then  you  start imposing values that are incompatible with what  matters  to  consumer. Your  brand  loses their coherence  and  consistency.  You  put  the  brand  through  so  much  of  re-launches, upgrades, extensions  and  proliferations  that  customers  cannot  remember  what  distinguishes  you.
  • Currently  Levers  is  embarked on a strategy of streamlining and focusing our brand portfolio  to ensure that we can invest in building our strongest brands — those brands with greatest consumer appeal — rather than dissipating energy and resources on brands with limited appeal or potential.
  • What’s important is staying connected with individual consumers, and then innovating to meet their evolving needs proactively, rather than confusing them with unnecessary complexity.
  • We want our brands to be favorites — first in the market, sometimes second, but not fifth, sixth or seventh — because big brands can innovate and grow for their consumers.
GREED
  • You  try  make  your  brands  more profitable  by  pricing  up  or  cost  reductions  but  in  the  process  kill the goose that laid  golden eggs.  You  shave   — a thin slice here, another in six months, a third by the end of the year -  and  each reduction is so insignificant that no-one will notice. Except, of course, people do notice.
  • When the price/value equation of a brand gets out of line, sooner or later — and usually sooner — people will notice. 
COMPLACENCY
  • Your  brand builds  reputation  and  sits back only to find  faster, hungrier, more innovative competitors  pass  you  by.
  • IBM  was  a   technology  company.  Then  they  built  a  good  image  so  users not only respected the  technology  but felt  loyal   as well.  Then  came  the critical stage. IBM  became  so  fixated  with  its  own  idea  of  its  brand  personality  that  it  ignored  competitive product performance.  IBM   neglected to innovate,  to invest in R&D,  to   listen intently for  faint murmurs of discontent.  For  years  nothing  happened  and  IBM  believed it  was  healthy.  Then, with savage suddenness, IBM  began  losing share and reputation.
INCONSISTENCY

A brand is  a trust-mark  and  useful to consumers precisely because it provides a consistent guarantee of quality not  only  in  terms  of  quality  and  features  but  also  in  customer service standards  and  indeed  in  every  aspect of the business.  Today  people  know  not  only  a  brand  but  even  its  manufacturer.  Consumer  movement  is  growing. Employees, consumers, governments, suppliers, shareholders and the media not only take an increasing interest in every aspect of a company’s activities, they also have the means at their fingertips to find out everything about them. There is no more certain way to damage your brands than to be seen to have double standards. If there is not clear congruity between brand values and corporate values, both will suffer irreversibly. This has important implications for brand management. With the reputation of the entire corporation increasingly impinging on the reputation of each and every brand — and vice-versa — the responsibility for the management of brand reputation lies at least as heavily with the chief executive as with the company’s brand managers.

MYOPIA

  • The traditional image of brand communication is a strictly one-way affair.  This, of course, is a highly simplistic image  but  even  then  the  consumer  challenged, interpreted, disputed, modified  or rejected  such  one  way  messages.
  • The way in which consumers form their opinions of brands is increasingly complex. Companies may distinguish between main media, promotions, public relations, sponsorship, product placement and the Internet — consumers make no such distinction. To them, every brand encounter helps build up a mental picture of the brand — whether it’s a planned and paid-for piece of brand communication or a chance encounter of a different kind. They may read disturbing reports of a company in the newspaper, see its trucks being badly driven on the motorway, be infuriated by incomprehensible instruction leaflets, be driven mad by the company’s call centre, receive graceless and misspelt letters from head office.

Saturday, August 4, 2012

The Future of Manufacturing Is in America, Not China

Technology drives  a U.S. industrial comeback. 
BY VIVEK WADHWA | JULY 17, 2012


A furor broke out last week after it was reported that the uniforms of U.S. Olympians would be manufactured in China. The story tapped into the anger -- and fear -- that Americans feel about the loss of manufacturing to China. Seduced by government subsidies, cheap labor, lax regulations, and a rigged currency, U.S. industry has rushed to China in recent decades, with millions of American jobs lost. But Ralph Lauren berets aside, the larger trends show that the tide has turned, and it is China’s turn to worry. What is going to accelerate the trend isn’t, as people believe, the rising cost of Chinese labor or a rising yuan. The real threat to China comes from technology. Technical advances will soon lead to the same hollowing out of China’s manufacturing industry that they have to U.S industry over the past two decades.

Several technologies will cause this.

First, robotics.
The robots of today aren’t the androids or Cylons that we are used to seeing in science fiction movies, but specialized electromechanical devices run by software and remote control. As computers become more powerful, so do the abilities of these devices. Robots are now capable of performing surgery, milking cows, doing military reconnaissance and combat, and flying fighter jets. Several companies, such Willow Garage, iRobot, and 9th Sense, sell robot-development kits for which university students and open-source communities are developing ever more sophisticated applications.

The factory assembly that China is currently performing is child’s play compared to the next generation of robots -- which will soon become cheaper than human labor. One of China’s largest manufacturers, Taiwan-based Foxconn Technology Group, announced last August that it plans to install one million robots within three years to do the work that its workers in China prese ntly do. It has found even low-cost Chinese labor to be too expensive and demanding.

Then there is artificial intelligence (AI) -- software that makes computers, if not intelligent in the human sense, at least good enough to fake it. This is the basic technology that IBM’s Deep Blue computer used to beat chess grandmaster Garry Kasparov in 1997 and that enabled IBM’s Watson to beat TV-show Jeopardy champions in 2011. AI is making it possible to develop self-driving cars, voice-recognition systems such as the iPhone’s Siri, and Face.com, the face-recognition software Facebook recently acquired.

Neil Jacobstein, who chairs the AI track at the Silicon Valley-based graduate program Singularity University, says that AI technologies will find their way into manufacturing and make it "personal": that we will be able to design our own products at home with the aid of AI design assistants. He predicts a "creator economy" in whi ch mass production is replaced by personalized production, with people customizing designs they download from the Internet or develop themselves.

How will we turn these designs into products? By "printing" them at home or at modern-day Kinko’s -- shared public manufacturing facilities such as TechShop, a membership-based manufacturing workshop, using new manufacturing technologies that are now on the horizon.

A type of manufacturing called "additive manufacturing" is now making it possible to cost-effectively "print" products. In conventional manufacturing, parts are produced by humans using power-driven machine tools, such as saws, lathes, milling machines, and drill presses, to physically remove material until you’re left with the shape desired. This is a cumbersome process that becomes more difficult and time-consuming with increasing complexity. In other words, the more complex the product you want to cre ate, the more labor is required and the greater the effort.

In additive manufacturing, parts are produced by melting successive layers of materials based on three-dimensional models -- adding materials rather than subtracting them. The "3D printers" that produce these parts use powered metal, droplets of plastic, and other materials -- much like the toner cartridges that go into laser printers. This allows the creation of objects without any sort of tools or fixtures. The process doesn’t produce any waste material, and there is no additional cost for complexity. Just as, thanks to laser printers, a page filled with graphics doesn’t cost much more than one with text (other than the cost of toner), with 3D printers we can print a sophisticated 3D structure for what it would cost to print something simple.

Three-D printers can already create physical mechanical devices, medical implants, jewelry, and even clothing. The cheapest 3D p rinters, which print rudimentary objects, currently sell for between $500 and $1,000. Soon, we will have printers for this price that can print toys and household goods. By the end of this decade, we will see 3D printers doing the small-scale production of previously labor-intensive crafts and goods. It is entirely conceivable that, in the next decade, manufacturing will again become a local industry and it will be possible to 3D print electronics and use giant 3D printing scaffolds to print entire buildings. Why would we ship raw materials all the way to China and then ship completed products back to the United States when they can be manufactured more cheaply locally, on demand?

Other advances in the next decade will likely affect manufacturing, particularly advances in nanotechnology that change the equation further. Engineers and scientists are today developing new types of materials, such as carbon nanotubes, ceramic-matrix nanocomposites, and new carbon fibers. These new materials make it possible to create products that are stronger, lighter, more energy-efficient, and more durable than existing manufactured goods. A new field -- "molecular manufacturing" -- will take this one step further and make it possible to program molecules inexpensively, with atomic precision. "Over the next two decades," Jacobstein says, "molecular manufacturing will do for our relationship with molecules and matter what the computer did for our relationship with bits and information -- make the precise control of molecules and matter inexpensive and ubiquitous." 
All of these advances play well into America’s ability to innovate, demolish old industries, and continually reinvent itself. The Chinese are still busy copying technologies we built over the past few decades. They haven’t cracked the nut on how to innovate yet.

It’s a near certainty that robotics, AI, and 3D-printing technologies will advance rapidly and converge. American companies are already finding the rising cost of labor, shipping costs and time lags, and intellectual-property protection to be major issues in doing business in China. And the Chinese government has done itself no favor by hoarding key raw materials such as rare-earth minerals, forcing Western manufacturers to start looking for alternatives. The most advanced automobile of today -- the Tesla Roadster -- is already being manufactured in the United States using robotic and AI technologies. Google just announced that it will produce its highly-acclaimed Nexus 7 tablet in the United States. This is just the beginning of the trend.

So, let me predict a future headline: "Protests break out in China over 2020 Summer Olympic uniforms, 3D-printed with U.S.-made technology."

Vivek Wadhwa is dire ctor of research at the Center for Entrepreneurship and Research Commercialization at Duke University and fellow at the Arthur and Toni Rembe Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University.

Thursday, April 26, 2012

Sayonara Sony: How Industrial, MBA-Style Leadership Killed a Once Great Company


Who can forget what a great company Sony was, and the enormous impact it had on our lives?  With its heritage, it is hard to believe that Sony hasn’t made a profit in 4 consecutive years, just recently announced it will double its expected loss for this year to $6.4 billion, has only 15% of its capital left as equity (debt/equity ration of 5.67x) and is only worth 1/4 of its value 10 years ago!
Sony was once a marketplace creator, and leader
After World War II Sony was the company that took transistor technology invented by Texas Instruments (TI) and made the popular, soon to become ubiquitous, transistor radio.  Under co-founder Akio Morita Sony kept looking for advances in technology, and company leadership spent countless hours innovatively thinking about how to apply these advances to improve lives.  With a passion for creating new markets, Sony was an early creator, and dominator, of what we now call “consumer electronics:”
  • Sony improved solid state transistor radios until they surpassed the quality of tubes, making good quality sound available very reliably, and inexpensively
  • Sony developed the solid state television, replacing tubes to make TVs more reliable, better working and use less energy
  • Sony developed the Triniton television tube, which dramatically improved the quality of color (yes Virginia, once TV was all in black & white) and enticed an entire generation to switch.  Sony also expanded the size of Trinitron to make larger sets that better fit larger homes
  • Sony was an early developer of videotape technology, pioneering the market with Betamax before losing a battle with JVC to be the standard (yes Virginia, we once watched movies on tape)
  • Sony pioneered the development of camcorders, for the first time turning parents – and everyone – into home movie creators
  • Sony pioneered the development of independent mobile entertainment by creating the Walkman, which allowed – for the first time – people to take their own recorded music with them, via cassette tapes
  • Sony pioneered the development of compact discs for music, and developed the Walkman CD for portable use
  • Sony gave us the Playstation, which went far beyond Nintendo in creating the products that excited users and made “home gaming” a market.
Very few companies could ever boast a string of such successful products.  Stories about Sony management meetings revealed a company where executives spent 85% of their time on technology, products and new applications/markets, 10% on human resource issues and 5% on finance.  To Mr. Morita financial results were just that – results – of doing a good job developing new products and markets.  If Sony did the first part right, the results would be good.  And they were.
The origin, and impact, of “Japan, Inc” on Sony
By the middle 1980s, America was panicked over the absolute domination of companies like Sony in product manufacturing.  Not only consumer electronics, but automobiles, motorcycles, kitchen electronics, steel and a growing number of markets.  Politicians referred to Japanese competitors, like the wildly successful Sony, as “Japan Inc.” – and discussed how the powerful Japanese Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI) effectively shuttled resources around to “beat” American manufacturers.  Even as rising petroleum costs seemed to cripple U.S. companies, Japanese manufacturers were able to turn innovations (often American) into very successful low-cost products growing sales and profits.
So what went wrong for Sony?
Firstly was the national obsession with industrial economics.  W. Edward Deming in 1950s Japan institutionalized manufacturing quality and optimization.  Using a combination of process improvements and arithmetic, Deming convinced Japanese leaders to focus, focus, focus on making things better, faster and cheaper.  Taking advantage of Japanese post war dependence on foreign capital, and foreign markets, this U.S. citizen directed Japanese industry into an obsession with industrialization as practiced in the 1940s — and was credited for creating the rapid massive military equipment build-up that allowed the U.S. to defeat Japan.
Unfortunately, this narrow obsession left Japanese business leaders, by and large, with little skill set for developing and implementing R&D, or innovation, in any other area.  As time passed, Sony fell victim to developing products for manufacturing, rather than pioneering new markets.
The Vaio, as good as it was, had little technology for which Sony could take credit.  Sony ended up in a cost/price/manufacturing war with Dell, HP, Lenovo and others to make cheap PCs – rather than exciting products.  Sony’s evolved a distinctly Industrial strategy, focused on manufacturing and volume, rather than trying to develop uniquely new products that were head-and-shoulders better than competitors.
In mobile phones Sony hooked up with, and eventually acquired, Ericsson.  Again, no new technology or effort to make a wildly superior mobile device (like Apple did.)  Instead Sony sought to build volume in order to manufacture more phones and compete on price/features/functions against Nokia, Motorola and Samsung.  Lacking any product or technology advantage, Samsung clobbered Sony’s Industrial strategy with lower cost via non-Japanese manufacturing.
When Sony updated its competition in home movies by introducing Blu-Ray, the strategy was again an Industrial one – about how to sell Blu-Ray recorders and players.  Sony didn’t sell the Blu-Ray software technology in hopes people would use it.  Instead it kept Blu-Ray proprietary so only Sony could make and sell Blu-Ray products (hardware).  Just as it did in MP3, creating a proprietary version usable only on Sony devices.  In an information economy, this approach didn’t fly with consumers, and Blue Ray was a money loser largely irrelevant to the market – as is the now-gone Sony MP3 product line.
We see this across practically all the Sony businesses.  In televisions, for example, Sony has lost the technological advantage it had with Trinitron cathode ray tubes.  In flat screens Sony has applied a predictable, but money losing Industrial strategy trying to compete on volume and cost.  Up against competitors sourcing from lower cost labor, and capital, countries Sony has now lost over $10B over the last 8 years in televisions.  Yet, Sony won’t give up and intends to stay with its Industrial strategy even as it loses more money.
Sony’s Leadership was a willing conspirator to the failed strategy
Why did Sony’s management go along with this?  As mentioned, Akio Morita was an innovator and new market creator.  But, Mr. Morita lived through WWII, and developed his business approach before Deming.  Under Mr. Morita, Sony used the industrial knowledge Deming and his American peers offered to make Sony’s products highly competitive against older technologies.  The products led, with industrial-era tactics used to lower cost.
But after Mr. Morita Sony’s other leaders were trained, like American-minted MBAs, to implement Industrial strategies.  Their minds put products, and new markets, second.  First was a commitment to volume and production – regardless of the products or the technology.  The fundamental belief was that if Sony had enough volume, and cut costs low enough, Sony would eventually succeed.  Without any innovation.
By 2005 Sony reached the pinnacle of this strategic approach by installing a non-Japanese to run the company.  Sir Howard Stringer made his fame running Sony’s American business, where he exemplified Industrial strategy by cutting 9,000 of 30,000 U.S. jobs (almost a full third.) To Mr. Stringer, strategy was not about innovation, technology, products or new markets.
Sony’s Industrial Strategy was cost-cut first, products are less meaningful
Mr. Stringer’s Industrial strategy was to be obsessive about costs. Where Mr. Morita’s meetings were 85% about innovation and market application, Mr. Stringer brought a “modern” MBA approach to the Sony business, where numbers – especially financial projections – came first.  The leadership, and management, at Sony became a model of MBA training post-1960.  Focus on a narrow product set to increase volume, eschew costly development of new technologies in favor of seeking high-volume manufacturing of someone else’s technology, reduce product introductions in order to extend product life, tooling amortization and run lengths, and constantly look for new ways to cut costs.  Be zealous about cost cutting, and reward it in meetings and with bonuses.
Thus, during his brief tenure running Sony Mr. Stringer will not be known for new products.  Rather, he will be remembered for initiating 2 waves of layoffs in what was historically a lifetime employment company (and country.)  And now, in a nod to Chairman Stringer the new CEO at Sony has indicated he will  react to ongoing losses by – you guessed it – another round of layoffs.  This time estimated to be another 10,000 workers, or 6% of employees.  The new CEO, Mr. Hirai, trained at the hand of Mr. Stringer, demonstrates as he announces ever greater losses that Sony hopes to – somehow – save its way to prosperity with an Industrial strategy.
Sony may not go bankrupt – but avoid it
Japanese equity laws are very different that the USA.  Companies often have much higher debt levels.  And companies can even operate with negative equity values – which would be technical bankruptcy almost everywhere else.  So it is not likely Sony will fill bankruptcy any time soon, if ever.
But should you invest in Sony?  After 4 years of losses, and entrenched Industrial strategy with MBA-style leadership focused on “numbers” rather than markets, there is no reason to think the trajectory of sales or profits will change any time soon.
As an employee, facing ongoing layoffs why would you wish to work at Sony?  A “me too” product strategy with little technical innovation that puts all attention on cost reduction would not be a fun place.  And offers little promotional growth.
And for suppliers, it is assured that each and every meeting will be about how to lower price – over, and over, and over.
Every company today can learn from the Sony experience
Sony was once a company to watch. It was an innovative leader, that pioneered new markets.  Not unlike Apple today.  But with its Industrial strategy and MBA numbers- focused leadership it is now time to say, sayonara.  Sell Sony, there are more interesting companies to watch and more profitable places to invest.

Sunday, April 8, 2012

Clash of the Cultures: Sales vs. Engineering

by Aaron Levie

It has long been a maxim of the technology industry that companies have to choose between building a culture around either sales or engineering. For those of us focused on the enterprise, the question is even more poignant, yet far less practical. And while Ben Horowitz contends that sales isn’t dead, startups keep trying to kill the sales function.

I’m often asked where Box’s culture falls and how that allegiance dictates our product and go-to-market philosophies, with the implication that any attempt at a middle-ground approach would dilute both culture and execution.

Unsurprisingly, the Valley has a strong bias towards hacker-centric engineering cultures. After all, isn’t the reason we build technology companies in the first place to avoid the hassle of unnecessary human interaction and friction? The Web is the great intermediary, theoretically negating the need for phone calls, price quotes, resellers, and so on. Self-service is the way of the future, and for many of us, it already represents an important part of our present. Sales organizations, then, are a relic approach, running counter to the promise of the Web, where software can be streamed on-demand.

We even go so far as to assume sales forces exist to compensate for inferior technologies. I’ll admit that before we had a sales team at Box, I assumed that companies that required sales to win were making up for some kind of product deficit. Just look at Oracle, SAP, or IBM: They move slowly, rarely innovate, and don’t build technology that users love. And they have remarkably strong sales organizations. Coincidence?

But this is where Silicon Valley and the rest of the world diverge. While everyone supports reducing friction, customers want the power to define what friction means to them. On Zappos, I can purchase shoes instantly with zero human interaction, but I can also call them if I have questions. And in the world of enterprise technology, buyers often want to be navigated by a product expert and have a representative voice when it comes to problems or suggested enhancements.

Do startups really have to choose? Can all-night hackathons, customer calls at 9am ET (a time unknown to any engineer), and face-to-face meetings with buyers coexist within the same company? Is it possible to take the innovation-driven engineering mindset of the consumer Internet and merge it with the go-to-market might that led Oracle and Siebel to global dominance?

Clash of the Cultures

When we decided in 2007 that our future at Box was selling to enterprises, terror set in. I imagined our culture would change overnight, and we’d wake up to an army of guys named Chuck and Chester* rolling around in Porsches, rocking gold watches and toting briefcases with smaller briefcases inside them. What would these new colleagues do to our vision and product?

My assumptions were extreme, but the underlying fear was real. We’ve seen it happen many times before in sales-centric enterprise software organizations: End of quarter deals that need just “one extra feature” drive product roadmaps off course. Firefighting issues in a litany of customer environments takes precious engineering time off of critical innovation initiatives. Worse, updates are promised based on customer timelines, with little consideration for what the engineering team is capable of meeting.

Given the fast-paced, transaction driven nature of sales, these organization often have little incentive to see through the long-term ramifications of such approaches to product design and development. Product perfection and value in the horizon is effectively traded for near-term profit. And so the dismantling begins.

Yet engineering-centric cultures aren’t much better at serving customers fully than their sales-centric counterparts. Amnon Landan, the early CEO of Mercury Interactive once said, ”R&D guys are the smartest group in any company…But their logic is often wrong for customers.”  To deliver the best possible value for customers, you instead need a mix of different personalities and perspectives. Some of our greatest innovations at Box emerge from engineering tinkering, yet many others come directly from our customers – often steps ahead of vendors in their needs and desires for technology.

The product metrics and KPIs that startups live and die by these days tell us a tremendous amount about what users do within the confines of our technology, but they dramatically understate or miss entirely the contexts in which customers use our technologies. What challenges do people run into after they use your tool? What are your product’s bleeding edge use cases, which customers have discovered but aren’t even on your radar yet? A strategic sales organization can become a competitive advantage, not a distraction.

Building a Customer Centered Culture

We decided that there had to be a better way to build a sales organization, by combining a customer-centric culture with a business model that was far more aligned with customer success, and using sales to shorten the feedback loop for customer insights.

We’re not alone in striving for that elusive harmony between sales and engineering.  Companies like Workday, GoodData, Yammer, Zendesk, and many others have created environments where engineers are immersed in, rather than shielded from, the business model and needs of customers. These are environments where sales people are thoughtful of the needs, challenges, and priorities of the engineering team. David Ulevitch describes the cultural balance at OpenDNS as “a business culture driven by engineers.”

And with this model, you can take advantage of recurrent touch-points with customers and prospects to discover their needs and your gaps. Instead of siloing sales and engineering, turn proximity into a competitive assault by dramatically shortening the distance from customer feedback to product execution. Our ongoing investments in security, mobility, and platform have all been driven by constant conversations with customers. Incumbents like Oracle or Microsoft, however, take years to absorb customer feedback from the field, resulting in products that are misaligned with customer needs or far behind the realities of modern business.

Of course, it’s easy to say all of this when you’re small and nimble, but the question will be how to scale this kind of atmosphere and culture, as a company grows and conflicting demands increase. Fortunately, the SaaS business model naturally keeps the sales organization in check. The elastic and disposable nature of “rented” cloud solutions precludes selling something that isn’t real or isn’t successful, and it also keeps engineering on the hook for shipping what the customer paid for. Perverse incentives cannot survive in this model, at not for very long. The only way to succeed as a vendor is to deliver customer success.

When it comes to culture, balance doesn’t mean compromise. Companies that can align both sales and engineering around customer needs will have better insight into the innovations that will keep them relevant and the motivation to build them.

Gripevine To Civilize Angry Twitter Mobs With Its Customer Complaint Platform


We’ve seen what social media can do to a company’s reputation. One little slip-up, like a PayPal Ruins Christmas rant, or a Chapstick social media death spiral, can damage years of precious brand building. More importantly, it can kill a company’s stock price.

Take United Breaks Guitars, a YouTube video that musician Dave Carroll made after United Airlines refused to reimburse him for breaking the neck of his checked guitar. It’s up for debate, but some have argued that the video, which has been viewed more than 11 million times, caused the company’s stock price to drop 10% to the tune of $180 million.

That’s enough to get a CEO’s attention. It’s enough to get a VC’s attention, too.
Carroll of broken guitar fame has joined forces with Richard Hue, head of Harbour Capital Management Group and developer Chris Caple, to form Gripevine, a customer complaint platform that helps companies manage customer service to better serve their customers.

They’ve raised $1 million in seed funding from angel investors and Hue’s contacts to build it.
You’ve no doubt come across Twitter-stream complaints to airlines, hotels, or cable companies. And then there’s Yelp, where anyone with an Internet connection, money for a meal, and an engorged sense of entitlement can damage a small business’s reputation with one-star reviews.

The point is not to empower overly entitled customers — they’re more than likely already capable of causing a shitstorm on Twitter or Facebook just fine on their own. The point is to solve customer problems. You can’t post a gripe to Gripevine without including a desired outcome. The company actively deletes gripes that are just pointless rants that “Company X sucks.”

“Yelp is for people to bash a company. What we’re doing is more like, ‘I had a bad experience eating here and I want a credit,’” Carroll said. That’s a good idea, considering Yelp has been sued by small business owners multiple times. (Accusations of extorting small business owners to remove negative reviews have been dropped.) Meanwhile, Gripevine is better for customer service complaints than Twitter, Carroll argued to me, because the entire situation can be spelled out in one message rather than a back and forth.

Knowing the way the Internet works, I think it’ll be extremely challenging for Gripevine to keep its complaints reasonable and out of the “Company X sucks” weeds. But I think it’s an admirable goal. Gripevine is spending a lot of time educating companies that they won’t be victimized by the angry masses on the site, Carroll said.
Gripevine sends the complaints to the company in question, prompting the company to claim its page on the site and resolve the dispute. Notably, Gripevine doesn’t promise anyone’s complaints will be solved, it just tries to improve the process.

The company side is where Gripevine’s business model kicks in. Since CEOs know they have to monitor the social media-chattering masses, they pour thousands of dollars into CRM systems like those from Radian6 to ensure they handle customer complaints properly — before they turn into PR disasters. Gripevine competes with Radian6, but it provides more than just listening tools, Carroll said.

For the 100 companies that have claimed their profiles, Gripevine provides them a dashboard, which they can use to manage their CRM systems. It’s fully integrated with Twitter and Facebook, allowing CRM workers to communicate with each other, prioritize gripes, and follow up, which is helpful in the event of a shift change.

For six months, the enterprise product has been free for customers. It’ll charge a subscription fee after that. Since launching two months ago, companies like HP, Sprint, Verizon, and Walgreens are already on board. More than 3500 users have signed up and more than 800 complaints have been lodged.

Steve Jobs was right: Dropbox is a feature, not a product


I’ve always been a big fan and committed user of Dropbox. Over the last couple years the handy file-sync app has gotten me out of many scrapes—when I need to access six-month-old interview notes when I’m out of town, it’s always a thrill to find them in my Dropbox. Along with my sit/stand desk, my Livescribe pen, and my MacBook Air, Dropbox is one of the few genuinely delightful tools I use regularly, and I’m constantly recommending it to friends and family.

And yet I’m extremely skeptical about Dropbox’s business prospects, and totally puzzled by the high hopes that otherwise smart people have pinned on its success. Dropbox is a great little file-syncing app, and founder Drew Houston and crew are already making some nice money out of it. But is it a $40 billion company? I doubt it. And when I hear folks like Benchmark’s Bill Gurley suggesting that it might be, and calling Dropbox “a major disruption,” I wonder if they’ve simply been blinded by the thrill of using an obviously well-crafted utility.

Gurley argues that in a multi-platform world—where we’ll all be carrying more devices that are possibly running a variety of OSes—we’ll clamor for some kind of easy, invisible, automatic way to keep our stuff synced between gadgets.

He’s right about that. We will need something to organize our lives between gadgets. The trouble is, it will be difficult to make a perfect gadget-syncing service that is also a great standalone business. There are two reasons for this. First, the perfect syncing service needs to do more than simply store files. Second, the perfect syncing service should be unlimited and free, or as close to it as possible. Dropbox will have a hard time doing the first of these for technical reasons, and if it does the second, it won’t be a very good business.

In its current form, Dropbox is great at syncing stuff that I’ve saved to my filesystem, but there’s a lot more to device syncing than just what I’ve stored in data files. When I switch from my desktop to laptop to my phone to my tablet, I would really like my device’s “state” to follow me, not just my files.

Right now, I happen to be traveling from the Bay Area to Seattle. When I left home, I was typing this article in a Word document on my Windows 7 desktop. The Word window occupied one half of one of my two huge desktop monitors. Splashed across the rest of the screens were several tab-filled Chrome windows, a few IM windows, and my text-based notepad.

When I later opened up my MacBook Air, I could access the Word file and my text notepad through Dropbox. But I had to make my computer do so. In a perfect syncing scenario, my laptop would know what I had been doing on my desktop and would offer to open up the right windows for me, preferably in the identical places on the screen—but Dropdox doesn’t do that. Worse, Dropbox can’t sync my Chrome and IM activity in any way. If I want to get the same tabs that I had on my desktop here on my laptop, I have to rely on Chrome’s own (fantastic) syncing feature. (There’s no way, as far as I know, to keep my IM windows synced between devices.)

I can think of many other things that would be great to keep synced between devices: Desktop icons and images, peripheral drivers (so that when I connect a camera to my work computer, my home computer recognizes it too), and application preferences (I like my Word documents set to 180 percent zoom).

I’m not the only one who’s been asking for this sort of thing. The Verge’s Joshua Topolsky has been yearning for a “continuous client” for years now, since back when he ran Engadget. But I’m hot holding my breath that we’ll see such super syncing anytime soon. Syncing the state of devices rather than just your files presents many difficult conceptual problems: What does it mean to sync windows between two gadgets that might have different windowing paradigms (say an iPad, which runs everything full screen, and your Mac)? What happens when you rely on two different apps to do the same tasks on different devices—for example, how would you sync tabs between Chrome or IE on your Windows desktop and Mobile Safari on your iPad?

Someday, someone will figure out how to make this sort of thing work well, but I suspect it will most likely be one of the companies that makes a major operating system: Either Apple, Microsoft, or Google. Each of these firms has a file-storage and/or syncing solution that it’s pushing, and I expect that those efforts—iCloud, Skydrive, Google’s Chrome syncing and perhaps the mythical Gdrive—will gradually incorporate more and more of the features I’m looking for.

Dropbox is probably working to build many of these features as well. But as third-party app, it’s just not in a very good technical position to do so. In order to sync programs and window states, Dropbox would need access to some of the deeper parts of my various gadgets’ OSes. This is easy for some operating systems and impossible with others—including iOS and probably Amazon’s Kindle Fire. Apple could easily build a way to sync the current browser tabs between my Mac and my iPhone, so that I can switch from reading Pando on my couch to reading it on the train. Dropbox will need to go through incredible hacks to achieve the same functionality, and it probably won’t manage to do so even then.

In fact, even now, as just a simple file-syncing app, Dropbox is frequently stymied by OS- and application-level problems. It won’t sync Microsoft Office files until you exit the application you’re using—if you forget to close your Word file on your home computer, it won’t be in your Dropbox at work. That’s not Dropbox’s fault—it’s Office that locks files that you’re using. But it highlights what I’m talking about: There’s a lot going on your computer, but Dropbox only has control over a small part of it.

You might argue that I’m making too many demands of Dropbox. So what if it doesn’t satisfy all the features I want—won’t people still pay for it if it keeps getting incrementally better as a file-syncing service? Maybe, but remember that online storage is a commodity. Dropbox makes money by charging people for increased storage space. But the price of storage keeps plummeting. It’s tending toward free. With all the competition it faces from firms with huge data centers, Dropbox isn’t going to be able to get people to keep paying $10 a month for 50 GB of space for many more years to come. It needs to add extra capabilities, too.

In 2009, Steve Jobs wanted to pay more than a hundred million dollars for Dropbox. As Houston later told Forbes’ Victoria Barret, when he politely turned down his hero’s offer, Jobs declared that Dropbox was a feature, not a product. Jobs was right: To do what we all want it to do, syncing has to be baked in to all the gadgets we use today. OS companies are warming to that notion—and they don’t need Dropbox to do it.